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Abstract 30 
 Recent theorizing suggests the 4Ns—that is, the belief that eating meat is 31 
natural, normal, necessary, and nice—are common rationalizations people use to 32 
defend their choice of eating meat. However, such theorizing has yet to be subjected 33 
to empirical testing. Six studies were conducted on the 4Ns. Studies 1a-1b 34 
demonstrated that the 4N classification captures the vast majority (83%-91%) of 35 
justifications people naturally offer in defense of eating meat. In Study 2, individuals 36 
who endorsed the 4Ns tended also to objectify (dementalize) animals and included 37 
fewer animals in their circle of moral concern, and this was true independent of social 38 
dominance orientation. Subsequent studies (Studies 3-5) showed that individuals who 39 
endorsed the 4Ns tend not to be motivated by ethical concerns when making food 40 
choices, are less involved in animal-welfare advocacy, less driven to restrict animal 41 
products from their diet, less proud of their animal-product decisions, tend to endorse 42 
Speciesist attitudes, tend to consume meat and animal products more frequently, and 43 
are highly committed to eating meat. Furthermore, omnivores who strongly endorsed 44 
the 4Ns tended to experience less guilt about their animal-product decisions, 45 
highlighting the guilt-alleviating function of the 4Ns. 46 
Keywords: meat, vegetarianism, rationalization, justification, animal welfare, 47 
attitudes  48 
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Rationalizing Meat Consumption: The 4Ns  49 
Introduction 50 
 Many omnivores are confronted by a “meat paradox” (Herzog, 2010; Joy, 51 
2010; Loughnan, Bastian, & Haslam, 2014; Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010). 52 
They are morally conflicted by the thought of their behavior harming animals, while 53 
also enjoying meat as a desirable staple in their diet. Loughnan et al. (2014) argue, 54 
consistent with cognitive dissonance theory (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-55 
Jones & Mills, 1999), that resolution of this conflict can take one of two routes: one 56 
can reject meat consumption, bringing one’s behaviors into alignment with one’s 57 
moral ideals, or one can bring one’s beliefs and attitudes in line with one’s behavior 58 
through various psychological maneuvers (see below).  The fact that omnivores 59 
continue to make up the vast majority of the world’s population (see Ruby, 2012) 60 
suggests that the latter route is most commonly adopted. 61 
 Research attests that there are numerous strategies available to omnivores to 62 
bring their beliefs and behavior in line, including denying that animals used as food 63 
suffer (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; Bratanova, Loughnan, & Bastian, 64 
2011), or that such animals are worthy of moral concern (Loughnan et al., 2010). One 65 
common, yet under-studied mechanism omnivores employ when resolving the meat 66 
paradox is rationalization. Rationalization involves providing reasonable 67 
justifications for one’s behavior when it comes under scrutiny or criticism, or when 68 
one’s behavior is perceived as discrepant with an integral aspect of one’s character 69 
(Kunda, 1990; Mercier, 2011; Tsang, 2002).  Rationalizing potentially morally 70 
troublesome behaviors has both social and personal benefits. Humans live in tight-71 
knit social groups in which it is important to manage and defend one’s actions to 72 
others (Ingram, Piazza, & Bering, 2009). Providing defensible reasons and arguments 73 
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for one’s actions when one’s actions are called into question is therefore an essential 74 
part of human sociality (Haidt, 2001; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Rationalization is 75 
also essential to maintaining a positive image of oneself as a good, moral person 76 
(Bandura, 1999; Jordan & Monin, 2008; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Research 77 
suggests that people often rationalize their behavior when they are motivated to 78 
continue in a practice or belief that they might otherwise feel guilty about on account 79 
of dissenting perspectives (Kundra, 1990; Haidt, 2001; Uhlmann, Pizarro, 80 
Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009). While the ultimate goal of rationalization is to persuade 81 
others of the legitimacy of one’s perspective, rationalization functions best if the actor 82 
is convinced by his or her own justifications (Tsang, 2002). One consequence of this 83 
motivated reasoning process is that people will often seek out arguments that support 84 
their own viewpoint, while overlooking or dismissing arguments that challenge it 85 
(Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Kuhn, 1991; Nickerson, 1998). This leads people to 86 
overestimate the amount of evidence that favors their position, known as “myside 87 
bias” or belief overkill (see Baron, 1995; Perkins, 1985; Stanovich, West & Toplak, 88 
2013).1  89 
 Meat eating is a practice that in recent years has become subject to criticism. 90 
Recent polls indicate that about 3-5% of adults in the U.S., and roughly 8% in Canada 91 
and 3-8% in the United Kingdom, self-identify as practicing vegetarians, though a 92 
number of polled vegetarians admit to sometimes eating meat, particularly fish or 93 
                                                        
1 In one unpublished study (Piazza, 2013) a group of Americans were asked to rate the extent 
to which animals were suffering as a result of current factory-farming practices in the U.S. 
Individuals who believed animals do not suffer much tended to also believe that raising 
livestock for meat does not have destructive consequences for the environment, that being a 
vegetarian does not help reduce world hunger, that eating meat has major health benefits and 
few risks, that practicing vegetarianism does not promote human-directed compassion, and 
that meat-based meals are more affordable than vegetarian-based meals. In short, people’s 
beliefs about vegetarianism came packaged in such a way that the bulk of evidence was 
stacked highly in favor of their preferred view, consistent with a belief-overkill or myside 
bias.     
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poultry (Gallup, 2012; GfK Social Research, 2009; National Institute of Nutrition, 94 
1997, 2001; Vegetarian Resource Group, 2012). Vegetarians often endorse a 95 
multitude of reasons for rejecting meat or restricting meat from their diet, including 96 
health, environment, and taste (see e.g., Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2004; Rozin, 97 
Markwith, & Stoess, 1997), yet an increasingly common motivation involves moral 98 
concerns about the cruel treatment of animals raised and slaughtered for food (Amato 99 
& Partridge, 1989; Beardsworth & Keil, 1991; Fessler, Arguello, Mekdara, & Macias, 100 
2003; Fox & Ward, 2008; Herzog, 2010; Jabs, Devine, & Sobal, 1998; Lindeman & 101 
Väänänen, 2000; Ruby, 2012; Santos & Booth, 1996). Although meat eating is still 102 
the norm in most countries, many people—including meat eaters themselves—believe 103 
that vegetarianism is a morally admirable practice for which vegetarians deserve 104 
credit (Minson & Monin, 2012; Ruby & Heine, 2011). For example, Ruby and Heine 105 
(2011) found that, all else equal, individuals who reject meat are rated as more 106 
virtuous than individuals who eat meat. This was true both among vegetarian and 107 
omnivore participants, and when controlling for perceptions of the healthiness of the 108 
vegetarian target’s diet. 109 
One consequence of this moral accreditation is that meat eaters sometimes 110 
respond defensively to the presence of vegetarians. This may be because vegetarian 111 
appeals and campaigns sometimes come across as self-righteous, and thus off-putting. 112 
Additionally, it may be that the moral commitments of vegetarians pose an implicit 113 
threat to meat eaters’ own moral identities. If some individuals refrain from eating 114 
animals out of concern for animal welfare, this raises the question of whether others 115 
should do likewise, in effect, “If we can do it, why don’t you?” (see Minson & Monin, 116 
2012). Thus, omnivores today sometimes find themselves in social situations where 117 
they must defend their commitments to eating meat.  118 
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The 3Ns of Justification 119 
According to Joy (2010), there are principally three categories of justifications 120 
that meat eaters have at their disposal to preserve their commitment to eating meat 121 
and diffuse any guilt they might otherwise experience as a consequence of consuming 122 
animal products. These justifications include that eating meat is natural, normal, and 123 
necessary, otherwise known as the “Three Ns of Justification” (see Joy, 2010, pp. 96-124 
97). Joy argues that through a recurrent process of socialization people come to 125 
believe that eating meat is natural—that eating meat is written in our biology, meat is 126 
what we naturally crave, and it is what our species evolved to eat; that eating meat is 127 
normal—that it is what most people in civilized society do and what most people 128 
expect from us; and that eating meat is necessary—that we need meat for survival or 129 
that we need to consume at least some meat to be strong, fully healthy individuals. 130 
Joy proposes that the 3Ns are widespread beliefs that are reinforced through various 131 
social channels, including family, media, religion, and various private and public 132 
organizations. For example, one popular belief related to the necessity of eating meat 133 
is the idea that one cannot maintain a diet that contains enough protein without 134 
consuming at least some meat. Although scientists, including the American Dietetic 135 
Association (ADA), America’s leading organization of nutritionists, have released 136 
numerous publications showing that this is not the case (see e.g., ADA, 2009; Rand, 137 
Pellett, & Young, 2003; Young & Pellett, 1994), the belief is persistent.  138 
 The application of the 3Ns is not limited to meat eating. The 3Ns may be a 139 
ubiquitous set of rationalizations that have an even broader application. Many 140 
historical practices, from slavery to sexism, have invoked the 3Ns as justification. For 141 
example, in defense of male-only voting practices in the U.S. opponents of women’s 142 
suffrage often appealed to the necessity of denying women the vote to prevent 143 
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“irreparable damage” to the nation, to the natural superiority of male intelligence, and 144 
to the historical normalness of male-only voting as “designed by our forefathers” 145 
(Joy, 2010, p. 97; see footnote for a contemporary example).2 Today, most people 146 
find such arguments in support of male-only voting ludicrous at best. However, it is 147 
often only after a system collapses that people come to scrutinize or question the 148 
justifications supporting it. By contrast, when an ideology is widely endorsed, as meat 149 
eating is in most parts of the world today, the justifications supporting the ideology 150 
generally go unchallenged. Unless directly challenged by an alternative viewpoint, 151 
people tend not to question the legitimacy of their rationalizations (see Haidt, 2001).  152 
A fourth “N” and present research 153 
Although there have been some qualitative studies of the 3Ns, mainly by Joy 154 
(2010), there is currently almost no systematic, quantitative research in support of the 155 
3Ns as prevalent meat-eating justifications. Nor has there been any work investigating 156 
the relationship between 3N endorsement and people’s eating practices, meat and 157 
animal-product consumption, or attitudes towards animal welfare. Thus, the present 158 
research was intended to fill this empirical gap.  159 
Before we outline our research plan and hypotheses, there is one final matter 160 
to address. There may be a fourth N specific to meat eating, not captured under the 161 
3N justification scheme. Several lines of evidence suggest that the enjoyment people 162 
derive from eating meat is a major barrier to reducing meat consumption and/or 163 
adopting a vegetarian diet (e.g., Kenyon & Barker, 1998; Lea & Worsely, 2001, 2003; 164 
Ruby, 2012). For example, Lea and Worsely (2001) found “meat appreciation and 165 
                                                        
2 3N justifications are currently being applied within various ongoing, ideological debates. As 
one example, opponents of same-sex marriage often appeal to the necessity of limiting 
marriage to heterosexual couples to prevent “further weakening of the institution...giving 
people in polygamous, incestuous, bestial, and other nontraditional relationships the right to 
marry”, to the naturalness of marriage as “a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the 
procreation and rearing of children within a family”, and to the normalness of heterosexual 
marriage as an institution “as old as the book of Genesis” (Gay Marriage ProCon.org, 2014).   
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enjoyment” to be one of the biggest obstacles for Australian women contemplating a 166 
vegetarian diet. Likewise, Rothgerber (2013) found that pro-meat attitudes, which 167 
tend to be higher among men, are a strong predictor of continued meat consumption. 168 
Furthermore, as we discuss below (see Studies 1a-1b), when meat-eaters are asked to 169 
defend their right to eat meat, they often appeal to the tastiness of meat, or the 170 
hedonic pleasure that they derive from it, as a justification for its continued 171 
consumption.   172 
For these reasons, we submit niceness as a fourth N (justification) used in 173 
defense of eating meat, closing out the 4Ns at natural, normal, necessary, and nice. 174 
We speculate that nice has largely been ignored by theorists as a potential justification 175 
category because it constitutes a very weak moral defense. This becomes apparent 176 
when it’s applied to less controversial ideologies, such as sexism.  Imagine someone 177 
making the argument that men should continue to be granted favor in society simply 178 
because men derive pleasure from their elevated position. Few people would find 179 
such an argument defensible, as it prioritizes the relatively trivial pleasure of some 180 
(men) over the much deeper suffering of others (women). Yet this argument is 181 
analogous to the one employed in defense of eating meat on account of the pleasure 182 
humans derive from it.3  183 
 In the present research, we tested whether the 4Ns are in fact the principal 184 
justifications omnivores offer in defense of their commitment to eating meat. In 185 
Studies 1a and 1b, we tested this very simply by having omnivores provide three 186 
reasons why they think it is acceptable to eat meat, and we coded their responses via 187 
independent raters. In Studies 2-5, our main aim was to develop an instrument for 188 
                                                        
3 Of course, one can argue that sexism and animal welfare are not completely analogous 
insofar as sexism negatively affects people and meat eating negatively affects animals. But 
unless a person does not care at all about the suffering of animals used as food, the argument 
remains analogous by degree.   
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reliably assessing 4N endorsement along a continuum, which could be used to assess 189 
the strength of an individual’s commitment to defending the legitimacy of their meat 190 
consumption. Finally, in these latter studies, we sought to test a number of predictions 191 
about the role of 4N endorsement in relation to people’s dietary practices, meat 192 
consumption, and the moral attitudes they hold towards animals.   193 
Study 1a and 1b – Spontaneous Justifications for Eating Meat  194 
 The aim of these studies was to test whether the 4Ns would emerge as the 195 
lion’s share of spontaneous justifications omnivores offer in defense of eating meat. 196 
The method was simple: we asked two different groups of individuals (university 197 
students in Study 1a; Mechanical Turk workers in Study 1b) to provide three reasons 198 
why it is “OK” to eat meat, and independent raters coded their responses.  199 
Study 1a  200 
 Participants, materials, and procedures. We recruited 188 students from the 201 
University of Pennsylvania to participate in exchange for course credit. The study was 202 
embedded in a larger package of studies with non-overlapping themes. In response to 203 
a filter question, “Do you ever eat meat, for example, beef, pork/ham, chicken, turkey, 204 
fish or other kinds of seafood?” twelve participants (6%) reported that they never eat 205 
meat. The remaining 176 meat-eating participants (114 women, 62 men; Mage = 19.66, 206 
SD = 2.07) continued with the meat-eating justification question, while the twelve 207 
non-meat-eaters skipped this question. Participants were instructed:  “Please give 208 
three reasons why you think it is OK to eat meat,” and were provided three separate 209 
textboxes to type in their three reasons. Among the sample of 176 meat eaters, 91% 210 
reported being “omnivores”, 6% “semi-vegetarians”, and 3% “pescetarians” (fish or 211 
seafood was the only meat they ate); 81% were American, 19% had other 212 
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nationalities. The sample was ethnically diverse, religiously diverse, and, on average, 213 
politically moderate.4  214 
Coding of justifications. Two participants offered only two justifications, 215 
while all others offered three, producing a grand total of 526 responses. Three of the 216 
authors [JP, MBR, SL] each read the entirety of responses given and together they 217 
devised a coding scheme to fully capture the range of responses offered (see Table 1 218 
for coding scheme and examples for each category). Next, two of the authors [JP, 219 
MBR] separately coded a different half of the responses using the coding scheme, and 220 
a third person, an English-speaking undergraduate student, blind to the objectives of 221 
the study, independently coded all of the responses. Interrater agreement was high 222 
between both sets of coders. There were 236 agreements out of 264 between the 223 
independent coder and JP (89.4% agreement rate). There were 250 agreements out of 224 
262 between the independent coder and MR (95.4% agreement). Disagreements 225 
between the raters were resolved via joint discussion sessions. Twelve responses were 226 
determined to be unscorable, leaving a final total of 514 scored responses. 227 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 228 
Results 229 
 Figure 1 presents the frequency of each response category. The 4Ns accounted 230 
for 83% of the total justifications offered. Necessary was the largest category, 231 
followed by Nice, Natural, and Normal, respectively. There were a fairly large 232 
                                                        
4 Study 1a ethnicity: 51% White/Caucasian, 24% East Asian, 9% Hispanic, 7% Black/African 
American, 9% other or multiple ethnicities. Religion: 23% Jewish, 21% Catholic, 10% 
Protestant, 4% Other Christian denomination, 3% Evangelical Christian, 3% Muslim, 3% 
Buddhist, 2% Hindu, 3% Personal spirituality, 9% had no religion/faith, 9% Agnostic, 10% 
Atheist. Measured on 1-7 scales, the sample was on average politically moderate (M = 3.27, 
SD = 1.31, 1 = “Very liberal”, 7 = “Very conservative”), somewhat religious (M = 2.78, SD = 
1.60, 1, = “Not at all religious”, 7 = “Very religious”), and moderately spiritual (M = 3.53, SD 
= 1.75, 1 = “Not at all spiritual”, 7 = “Very spiritual”).  
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percent of miscellaneous justifications in this sample, but the percent of 233 
miscellaneous justifications never exceeded the percent obtained for each of the 4Ns. 234 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 235 
 In sum, the 4Ns made up the bulk of justifications spontaneously offered by 236 
omnivores in defense of eating meat. In Study 1b, we sought to replicate this finding 237 
using a different, non-student sample. 238 
Study 1b 239 
 We recruited 107 adults (49 women, 57 men; Mage = 34.90, SD = 12.15) using 240 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). All participants were located in the 241 
U.S. and paid for their participation. Although we did not assess participants’ diet in 242 
this study, rates of non-omnivores (strict vegetarians and vegans) among MTurk 243 
workers tend to reflect levels on par with the overall population (1-5%; see Studies 3-244 
5).  The phrasing of the meat justification probe was the same as in Study 1a (i.e., 245 
“Please give three reasons why you think it is OK to eat meat”). A total of 321 246 
responses were collected. Two independent raters (undergraduate students; one blind 247 
to the hypotheses) coded the responses and agreed in their classification 95.7% of the 248 
time. Disagreements were resolved between the two raters through discussion.  249 
 As can be seen in Figure 2, the category frequencies were quite consistent 250 
with the results from Study 1a. The 4Ns accounted for 91% of the total justifications 251 
offered. As in Study 1a, Necessary was the most frequent justification category. 252 
Necessary was followed by Natural, Nice, and Normal, respectively. Thus, the results 253 
largely replicated Study 1a, yet with an even larger representation of the 4Ns offered 254 
as justifications for eating meat. 255 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 256 
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 Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated the prevalent use of the 4Ns as justifications 257 
for eating meat. In the following studies, we turn to the objectives of developing a 258 
reliable instrument (the 4N scale) for assessing 4N endorsement as a continuous 259 
measure, and testing the relationship between 4N endorsement and various dietary 260 
and animal-welfare practices and motivations.  261 
Study 2 – The 4Ns and Moral Concern for Animals 262 
Study 2 had four objectives. First, we developed a scale for assessing 4N 263 
endorsement as a continuous variable. Second, we sought to show that individuals 264 
with dietary restrictions regarding meat would endorse the 4Ns to a lesser extent than 265 
individuals without these restrictions. Third, we tested whether our newly developed 266 
4N scale would predict various morally relevant attitudes towards animals, including 267 
the diversity of animals one cares about and the degree to which individuals attribute 268 
mental capacities to animals. Increasing evidence suggests that meat eaters objectify 269 
or de-mentalize animals (i.e., deny that animals have mental properties, such as the 270 
capacity to suffer or experience pleasure), particularly when they are confronted by an 271 
ostensible contradiction between eating meat and caring about animals (Bastian et al., 272 
2012; Bratanova et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010). For example, in one study 273 
(Loughnan et al., 2010), participants were randomly assigned to consume either beef 274 
jerky or nuts, and, subsequently, to rate a cow’s capacity to suffer. Participants who 275 
ate beef rated cows as less capable of suffering than participants who ate nuts, 276 
possibly as a means of reconciling their beliefs (“cows don’t matter”) with their 277 
actions (“I eat cows”). Here we sought to test the hypothesis that individuals who tend 278 
to de-mentalize animals also tend to rationalize their meat eating.  279 
As a final objective, we sought to show that endorsement of the 4Ns is greater 280 
among individuals who tend to endorse anti-egalitarian values and support 281 
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hierarchical group-based systems of inequality (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 282 
1994). Some previous research by Allen, Wilson, Ng, and Dunne (2000) suggests that 283 
individuals on the higher end of the vegetarian-omnivore continuum (i.e., those who 284 
consume higher quantities of meat) tend to be more supportive of inequality in group 285 
relationships than individuals on the lower end. In particular, they found modest 286 
correlations between omnivore identification and both right-wing authoritarianism 287 
(Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994). 288 
Individuals high in SDO are motivated to see their own groups dominate other 289 
groups. Arguably, motivations to defend meat consumption may share a common 290 
origin with motivations for group-based inequality (i.e., between humans and 291 
animals). Thus, we expected 4N endorsement to correlate positively with SDO. 292 
However, we also expected 4N endorsement to have explanatory power that extends 293 
beyond any relationship it has with SDO, as we expect omnivores low in SDO to also 294 
engage in meat-consumption rationalization. Consistent with such a hypothesis, we 295 
predicted that 4N endorsement would negatively predict mentalizing (attributing 296 
mental states to animals) and moral regard for animals, independent of SDO.  297 
Method 298 
Participants and dietary classification. Participants were 171 students from 299 
the University of Melbourne, Australia (106 women, 63 men, 2 other or missing; Mage 300 
= 22.91, SD = 5.11). Participants were recruited from a university campus food hall. 301 
Participation was voluntary. Diet was assessed on a continuum rather than as a 302 
dichotomous choice (for similar approaches, see Allen et al., 2000; Hamilton, 2006; 303 
Rozin et al., 2012). Participants reported one of seven diets ranging from strong 304 
identification with meat eating (meat-eater, or omnivore) to restricted omnivore 305 
(limited meat intake, e.g., only fish or chicken, no red meat) to strong identification 306 
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with meat abstinence (lacto-ovo vegetarian, or vegan). Based on their self-reported 307 
diet, participants were divided into three groups (73 omnivores; 40 restricted 308 
omnivores; 58 vegetarians and vegans). 309 
Measures. 310 
4N Scale. Sixteen items, four items per N, were generated by three of the 311 
authors [JP, SL, HMW], taking inspiration partly from Joy’s (2010) discussion of the 312 
3Ns of Justification. The four resulting subscales with their corresponding items and 313 
Cronbach’s s were as follows:  314 
 Natural (“It is only natural to eat meat”, “Our human ancestors ate meat all 315 
the time”, “It is unnatural to eat an all plant-based diet”, “Human beings are 316 
natural meat-eaters – we naturally crave meat”; α = .78)  317 
 Necessary (“It is necessary to eat meat in order to be healthy”, “A healthy diet 318 
requires at least some meat”, “You cannot get all the protein, vitamins and 319 
minerals you need on an all plant-based diet”, “Human beings need to eat 320 
meat”; α = .87)  321 
 Normal (“It is normal to eat meat”, “It is abnormal for humans not to eat 322 
meat”, “Most people eat meat, and most people can’t be wrong”, “It is 323 
common for people to eat meat in our society, so not eating meat is socially 324 
offensive”; α = .65) 325 
 Nice (“Meat is delicious”, “Meat adds so much flavor to a meal it does not 326 
make sense to leave it out”, “The best tasting food is normally a meat-based 327 
dish (e.g., steak, chicken breast, grilled fish)”, “Meals without meat would just 328 
be bland and boring”; α = .84).  329 
 330 
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The overall scale had a strong internal reliability (α = .93). Participants rated their 331 
level of agreement or disagreement with each item on a 1-7 scale (1 = completely 332 
disagree; 4 = neither agree nor disagree; 7 = completely agree). 333 
 Moral concern for animals and mind attribution. To examine whether these 334 
dietary groups can be distinguished on the basis of how they think about animals, we 335 
measured moral concern and mind attribution. To measure moral concern, we adapted 336 
the “moral circle” measure from Laham (2009) (see also Bratanova, Loughnan, & 337 
Gatersleben, 2012; Loughnan et al., 2010). Participants were presented with a list of 338 
26 animals prefaced with the instruction: “When we think about entities in the world, 339 
we might feel a moral obligation to show concern for the welfare and interests of 340 
some of those entities. Below is a list of entities. Circle those that you feel morally 341 
obligated to show concern for.” We used the number of animals circled divided by the 342 
total number of possible animals as their moral concern score, with higher scores 343 
indicating larger moral circles. To assess mind attribution, or more precisely the 344 
extent to which people deny mental states to food animals, participants were asked to 345 
imagine a cow (beef is the most commonly consumed meat in Australia; Australian 346 
Bureau of Statistics, 2013) and to rate the extent to which they believe the cow 347 
possessed 20 mental capabilities on a Likert scale (1 = definitely does not possess; 7 = 348 
definitely does possess). The scale comprises two dimensions previously identified to 349 
capture the way people think about minds (see Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007): agency 350 
(8 items; e.g., planning, self-control) and experience (12 items; e.g., joy, hunger). All 351 
20 items were averaged as our measure of mind attribution. The overall reliability of 352 
the scale was good ( = .89). 353 
Social dominance orientation. Previous work has identified endorsement of 354 
social inequality as an important characteristic in distinguishing between vegetarians 355 
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and omnivores (Allen et al., 2000). We therefore measured the extent to which 356 
participants possessed system-justifying tendencies such as endorsement of 357 
hierarchical group dominance (e.g., “Superior groups should dominate inferior 358 
groups”; 1 = strongly agree; 7 = strongly disagree), using the 16-item Social 359 
Dominance Orientation questionnaire (α = .91; Pratto et al., 1994).  360 
Procedure. Participants were recruited by one of the authors [ML] from a 361 
university food hall between 10am and 3pm over a two-month period. All people 362 
entering the area were approached and asked to participate. On agreement, they were 363 
provided with a questionnaire5, which they completed independently. The order of 364 
scales used in the questionnaire was counterbalanced using a Latin-square design, and 365 
all items were presented in a standard random order. 366 
Results 367 
 Correlations between the 4N scale and other measures can be seen in Table 2. 368 
Skewness was an issue particularly for the moral concern and mind attribution 369 
measures, due to significant differences in responding as a function of diet. Thus, to 370 
reduce Skewness we log transformed scores for these measures prior to calculating 371 
Pearson’s correlations. The data contained small amounts of missing data where 372 
participants did not complete all measures, and this is reflected in the variable degrees 373 
of freedom across the analyses.  374 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 375 
 4N scale. There was a main effect of diet on overall 4N endorsement, 376 
F(2,168) = 130.22, p < .001, 2p = .608—a very large overall effect. It was predicted 377 
that individuals would endorse the 4Ns in relation to their level of meat restriction in 378 
                                                        
5 Aquino and Reeds’ (2002) 10-item moral identity scale was also included in the 
questionnaire, and had no clear relationship to the 4N scale. Please contact the authors for 
more information. 
THE 4NS  18 
 
 
 
their diet. Consistent with this prediction, omnivores endorsed the 4Ns at a 379 
significantly higher rate (M = 4.06, SD = 0.96) than both restricted omnivores (M = 380 
2.58, SD = 0.77) and vegetarians/vegans (M = 1.82, SD = 0.56), and restricted 381 
omnivores endorsed the 4Ns significantly more than vegetarians/vegans, p < .001 for 382 
all comparisons (Tukey’s HSD). Consistent with a belief-overkill effect or myside 383 
bias, these diet-based differences held across all four subscales, Fs > 59.40, ps < .001, 384 
2p = .354-.594; ps < .03 for all groupwise comparisons (see Figure 3).  385 
A few further observations are worth noting. First, of all the Ns, Natural had 386 
the highest endorsement ratings among individuals with meat-restricted diets. Second, 387 
Normal had the lowest level of endorsement among omnivores. Finally, Nice 388 
produced the largest drop in endorsement ratings when comparing omnivores with 389 
restricted omnivores and vegetarians/vegans. 390 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 391 
Moral concern. Diet had an overall effect on moral concern for animals, 392 
F(1,156) = 33.52, p < .001, 2p = .302. As expected, omnivores included fewer 393 
animals in their circle of moral concern (M = .52, SD = .32), as compared to both 394 
restricted omnivores (M = .72, SD = .35) and vegetarians/vegans (M = .96, SD = .16), 395 
Tukey’s HSD tests, ps < .002. Likewise, restricted omnivores included fewer animals 396 
in their moral circle than did vegetarians/vegans, p < .001. Thus, increased adherence 397 
to a meat-based diet was associated with less moral concern for animals.  398 
Mind attribution. Diet had an overall effect on mind attribution to animals, 399 
F(2,168) = 21.83, p < .001, 2p = .206. On average, vegetarians/vegans attributed 400 
animals more mind (M = 5.51, SD = 0.75) than did omnivores (M = 4.56, SD = 0.85) 401 
and restricted omnivores (M = 4.97, SD = 0.82), Tukey’s HSD, ps < .005. Likewise, 402 
restricted omnivores attributed more mind to animals than did omnivores, p = .029. In 403 
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short, increased adherence to a meat-based diet was associated with attributing less 404 
mind to animals.  405 
SDO. There was an overall effect of diet on system justification 406 
endorsement as measured via SDO, F(2,168) = 27.09, p < .001, 2p = .244. As 407 
expected, omnivores were more likely to endorse exploitative ideologies (M = 2.87, 408 
SD = 0.98) than were restricted omnivores (M = 2.01, SD = 0.70) and 409 
vegetarians/vegans (M = 1.87, SD = 0.70), Tukey’s HSD, ps < .001, who in turn did 410 
not differ in SDO, p = .70. 411 
Regression analysis. To examine whether 4N endorsement predicted moral 412 
concern for animals and mind attribution to animals independent of SDO, we entered 413 
the 4N scale and SDO simultaneously into a regression predicting moral concern, and, 414 
separately, predicting mind attribution. For both measures, the 4N scale predicted a 415 
significant portion of variance independent of SDO: 4N endorsement independently 416 
predicted having a less inclusive moral circle,  = -.34, t(156) = -4.37, p < .001, and 417 
attributing less mind to animals,  = -.26, t(168) = -3.38, p = .001, as did SDO,  = -418 
.31, t(156) = -3.99, p < .001, and  = -.30, t(168) = -3.86, p < .001 (respectively).  419 
 In sum, omnivores endorsed the 4Ns to a greater extent than did individuals 420 
who had more meat-restricted diets. This was true across all four Ns. Furthermore, 4N 421 
endorsement predicted moral concern for fewer animals and less mentalizing, 422 
independent of SDO, though 4N endorsement correlated with SDO. Thus, 4N meat 423 
justification appears to be related to inequality justification, but it has predictive value 424 
beyond this relationship. 425 
Study 3 – The 4Ns and Other Meat-eating Psychological Defenses 426 
 The main aim of Study 3 was to explore the relationship between the 4N 427 
scale with another recently developed measure of psychological defenses meat 428 
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eaters engage in—Rothgerber’s (2013) Meat-Eating Justification (MEJ) scale. The 429 
MEJ assesses a number of different psychological strategies, including both direct 430 
and indirect strategies. Within Rothgerber’s theorizing, direct strategies include 431 
denying that animals suffer when being raised and killed for meat, a process related 432 
to objectification, discussed in Study 2 (e.g., “Animals do not feel pain the same 433 
way humans do”); general pro-meat appeals (e.g., “I enjoy eating meat too much to 434 
ever give it up”); and explicit endorsements of various justifications for eating meat, 435 
including religious justifications (e.g., “God intended for us to eat animals”), health 436 
justifications (e.g., “Meat is essential for strong muscles”), hierarchical 437 
justifications (e.g., “Humans are at the top of the food chain and meant to eat 438 
animals”), and fate or destiny justifications (e.g., “Our early ancestors ate meat, and 439 
we are supposed to also”). From our perspective, many of these justification 440 
categories are encompassed by several of the 4N categories, specifically, Natural 441 
(hierarchy, fate, religion6) and Necessary (health), and the pro-meat subscale is 442 
quite similar to Nice. Thus, it would be surprising if the 4N scale did not correlate 443 
highly with the MEJ-Direct strategies. At the same time, the MEJ also assesses two 444 
indirect strategies available to meat eaters, which includes avoiding thoughts of 445 
animal suffering (e.g., “I try not to think about what goes on in slaughterhouses”), 446 
and dissociating meat from its origins (e.g., “I do not like to think about where the 447 
meat I eat comes from”). Given that the 4N scale is a measure of meat-eating 448 
rationalizations, and thus has less in common with these indirect strategies, we 449 
refrained from speculating about the 4N scale’s relationship with the MEJ-Indirect 450 
                                                        
6 The MEJ religion category is operationalized in terms of meat consumption fulfilling God’s 
natural order or God’s will for humans to have dominion over animals, which is encompassed 
by the Natural category in the 4N scheme.  
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subscale, though we anticipated that its relationship with this subscale would be 451 
much weaker than its relationship with the MEJ-Direct subscale. 452 
As a secondary aim we sought to investigate the relationship between 4N 453 
endorsement and various food choice motivations, including ethical food choice 454 
motivations such as animal welfare or environmental concerns. We predicted that 455 
people who endorse the 4Ns should be less motivated by ethical concerns when 456 
making food choices.  Finally, as an exploratory goal, we assessed the role of 457 
gender in 4N endorsement.    458 
Method 459 
Participants and diet. We recruited a new sample of 195 adults via 460 
Mechanical Turk. All participants were located in the U.S. and were compensated 461 
for their participation. Three participants did not complete the survey, leaving a total 462 
of 192 (100 women, 83 men, 5 other or missing; Mage = 35.74, SD = 13.02). The 463 
majority of the sample identified as “omnivores/non-vegetarians” (86%), 9% as 464 
“partial vegetarians,” and 5% as “other” (e.g., pescetarian). Nine additional 465 
participants were recruited that identified as vegetarian or vegan, but due to 466 
experimenter error they did not receive the full battery of materials (specifically, 467 
they did not receive the MEJ scale), and thus were not included in the analyses 468 
reported here (exceptions are footnoted). 469 
Materials and procedures. In the following set order, participants 470 
answered several subscales of the Food Choice Questionnaire (FCQ: Health, 471 
Familiarity, Sensory appeal, Natural content, and Weight control; only the three-472 
highest loading items from each subscale were administered, 15 items total; see 473 
Steptoe, Pollard, & Wardle, 1995), the Animal Welfare and Environmental 474 
Protection subscales of the Ethical Food Choice Questionnaire (5 items total; 475 
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Lindman & Väänänen, 2000), the Meat-Eating Justification (MEJ) Scale (27 items 476 
total; Rothgerber, 2013), and a slightly revised version of the 16-item 4N Scale (one 477 
Normal item was reworded; for subscale reliabilities see footnote).7 In this study, 478 
the 4N scale had a strong internal reliability (Cronbach’s  = .94).  479 
The FCQ presents participants with a number of statements that finish the 480 
sentence, “It is important that the food I eat on a typical day…” (e.g., “…keeps me 481 
healthy”). The Animal Welfare and Environmental Protection subscales follow the 482 
same format, as they were designed as an extension of the FCQ (see Lindman & 483 
Väänänen, 2000; e.g., “…has been produced in a way that animals have not 484 
experienced pain”; “…has been prepared in an environmentally friendly way”).  485 
The scale ranged from 1 = Not at all important to 4 = Very important.   486 
The MEJ (Rothgerber, 2013) contains nine first-order subscales (pro-meat, 487 
deny, dichotomize, fate, religion, health, hierarchy, dissociation, avoid) that can be 488 
further divided into two second-order subscales (Direct vs. Indirect strategies). Each 489 
first-order subscale contains three items. The dichotomize subscale, which was not 490 
discussed above, is a first-order MEJ subscale designed to assess the process of 491 
dichotomizing (or splitting) animals into different categories, such as “pets” vs. 492 
“food animals.” As reported by Rothgerber (2013), the dichotomize subscale 493 
generally produces the lowest internal reliabilities (αs ranged from .53 to .55), and 494 
the dichotomize items tend to load more highly with the direct items than the 495 
                                                        
7 For this study, we amended one of the Normal items to avoid a double-barreled phrasing. 
The item “It is common for people to eat meat in our society, so not eating meat is socially 
offensive” was amended to simply “In my country, not eating meat breaks social norms.” 
Amending this item led to a slight improvement in the internal reliability of the Normal 
subscale (Cronbach’s  = .71). Reliabilities for the other subscales ranged from .81-.95. An 
exploratory factor analysis of the 4N items, using parallel analysis as our extraction method, 
revealed a single-factor solution (eigenvalue = 8.77) explaining 54.8% of the total variance. 
Arguably, a second factor (eigenvalue = 1.59) comprised of just one of the Normal items also 
emerged. Thus, in the latter studies (see esp. Study 5) we continued to make further 
improvements to the Normal subscale. 
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indirect items. Thus, we treated dichotomize as a direct factor. In previous studies, 496 
Rothgerber (2013) found that men tend to endorse the MEJ-Direct strategies more 497 
so than women, while women tend to adopt the indirect strategies more so than men 498 
(the exception being dichotomize, which did not differ by gender). It was also found 499 
that many of the direct strategies correlated positively with meat consumption (i.e., 500 
they functioned successfully as meat-eating defenses), while the indirect strategies 501 
often correlated negatively with meat consumption (i.e., they were counter-502 
productive as meat-eating defenses). Rothgerber did not report factor analyses of the 503 
MEJ items. Nonetheless, in our sample, the 27 MEJ items factor loaded onto three 504 
separate factors (eigenvalues = 8.87, 4.26, 2.00), accounting for 56.1% of the 505 
cumulative variance. The first factor was comprised of all of the direct items 506 
(including dichotomize items), and the second factor was comprised of all the 507 
indirect items. The third factor was comprised of the three religious justification 508 
items, which cross-loaded with the first factor. Since all of the religious items 509 
loaded more strongly with the first factor than the third factor, we dropped the third 510 
factor and aggregated the religious items with the other direct items—which is 511 
consistent with Rothgerber’s theorizing.   512 
We assessed MEJ in terms of participants’ level of agreement or 513 
disagreement with the items on a -4 (Strongly disagree) to 4 (Strongly agree) scale 514 
(with 0 = Neither agree nor disagree). The same 9-point bipolar scale was used for 515 
the 4N scale. Basic demographic information (gender, age, socio-economic status 516 
[SES] relative to other Americans) was also collected. 517 
Results 518 
Preliminary analysis. Repeated-measures t-tests between the subscales 519 
revealed that Nice (M = 1.23, SD = 1.89) was endorsed to a greater extent than were 520 
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the other Ns (all ps < .001), followed by Natural (M = 0.85, SD = 1.68). Participants 521 
endorsed that eating meat is Necessary (M = 0.34, SD = 2.23) and Normal (M = 522 
0.13, SD = 1.68) at equal levels (p = .091), yet lower than endorsement levels for 523 
Nice and Natural (ps < .001). 524 
 Overall, men endorsed the 4Ns more strongly (M = 6.02, SD = 1.45) than 525 
did women (M = 5.36, SD = 1.70), F(1, 182) = 8.01, p = .005, η2p = .042 (we 526 
excluded “other gender” participants from the analysis of gender). Respectively, 527 
men endorsed Normal (M = 5.52, SD = 1.60 vs. M = 4.80, SD = 1.70) and Nice (M 528 
= 6.79, SD = 1.66 vs. M = 5.84, SD = 1.91) more than women, Fs > 8.77, ps < .004, 529 
η2p = .046-.066, but did not differ from women in their endorsement of Natural or 530 
Necessary, Fs < 3.24, ps > .07, η2p = .015-.017. Consistent with Rothgerber’s 531 
(2013) findings, overall men scored higher on the MEJ than women (M = 5.38, SD 532 
= 1.26), F(1, 182) = 6.88, p = .009, η2p = .036, but this was due to men engaging in 533 
more direct strategies (M = 5.91, SD = 1.20) than women (M = 5.09, SD = 1.52), 534 
F(1, 182) = 15.99, p < .001, η2p = .081. By contrast, women engaged in more 535 
indirect strategies (M = 6.40, SD = 1.66) than men (M = 5.61, SD = 1.96), F(1, 182) 536 
= 8.94, p = .003, η2p = .047. Neither the 4N scale nor the MEJ scale correlated 537 
significantly with participants’ age or SES (rs < .08, ps > .29). 538 
 The 4N scale correlated moderately to highly with all seven of the MEJ-539 
Direct subscales, but it did not correlate with either of the MEJ-Indirect subscales 540 
(see Table 3). The 4N Scale correlated at r = .84 with the overall MEJ-Direct scale, 541 
and r = -.04 with the MEJ-Indirect scale. This makes sense theoretically, as the 542 
indirect strategies of dissociating or avoiding thoughts of animal suffering are 543 
passive responses, whereas the direct strategies involve many explicit 544 
rationalizations, much like the 4Ns. It is not surprising then that the MEJ-Pro-meat, 545 
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MEJ-Hierarchy, MEJ-Fate and MEJ-Health subscales have the highest correlations 546 
with the 4N scale, given their similarities with the 4N-Nice, 4N-Natural and 4N-547 
Necessary subscales.  548 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 549 
 Food choice motivations. Table 4 depicts the correlations between the 4N 550 
scale and the various food-choice motivations, and the same for the MEJ scale. 551 
With regards to non-ethical motivations, people who selected food on the basis of 552 
its familiarity were more inclined to endorse the 4Ns. With regards to ethical 553 
motivations, as predicted, individuals who were concerned about the environment, 554 
and to a lesser extent animal welfare, were less inclined to endorse the 4Ns.8 The 555 
MEJ behaved very similarly to the 4N scale, with the addition that the MEJ 556 
correlated negatively with natural content motivations as well (see Table 4). 557 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 558 
 In sum, men endorsed the 4Ns to a greater extent than did women. The 4N 559 
scale correlated with other types of meat-eating justifications and defenses, as 560 
measured by the MEJ-Direct subscale, but endorsement of the 4Ns was unrelated to 561 
dissociation and avoidance meat-eating strategies. Additionally, individuals who 562 
endorsed the 4Ns were motivated to make food choices on the basis of the familiarity 563 
of the food, while individuals who rejected the 4Ns were motivated to select foods 564 
that promote animal and ecological welfare.  Similar results were obtained for the 565 
MEJ-Direct subscale. Although the two scales have some overlapping components, 566 
we believe the 4N scale has several distinct methodological strengths, which we 567 
discuss at length in the General Discussion. 568 
                                                        
8 When the nine vegetarians/vegans were included in the analysis the correlation between 
animal welfare and the 4Ns was significant, r(199) = -.18, p = .011, as was the correlation 
between environmental protection and the 4Ns, r(199) = -.21, p = .003. 
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Study 4 – The 4Ns, Animals-Product Choices, Moral Emotions and Self- 569 
Appraisals  570 
Studies 2-3 provided some initial evidence that individuals who reject the 4Ns 571 
tend to have more meat-restricted diets (Study 2), are more concerned with the 572 
welfare of animals (Study 2), and are motivated by ethical concerns when making 573 
food choices (Study 3). The aim of Study 4 was to demonstrate in a more 574 
comprehensive manner the role of 4N endorsement in people’s dietary and lifestyle 575 
practices involving animal products, as well as the self-directed emotions (e.g., guilt, 576 
pride) and appraisals generated from these practices. We also sought to correlate 4N 577 
endorsement with a person’s level of involvement in animal-welfare advocacy and 578 
their endorsement of Speciesist attitudes (i.e., prioritizing human interests above 579 
animal interests; see e.g., Singer, 2009). To this end, we recruited a more 580 
heterogeneous sample that included full vegetarians and vegans, in addition to 581 
omnivores and semi-vegetarians who were concerned to some degree about their 582 
consumption of animal products.  583 
We predicted that 4N endorsement would be negatively related to (a) taking 584 
active steps towards restricting one’s use and consumption of animal products, (b) 585 
animal-welfare advocacy, and (c) experiencing pride and appraisals of moral self-586 
regard in relation to one’s animal-product consumption. By contrast, we predicted that 587 
4N endorsement would be positively related to (d) the endorsement of Speciesist 588 
attitudes towards animals. With regards to guilt experienced due to one’s 589 
consumption of animal products, we were uncertain how 4N endorsement would 590 
relate to this variable. If Joy (2010) is correct that meat-eating justifications serve to 591 
“alleviate the moral discomfort we might otherwise feel when eating meat” (p. 97), 592 
then we might expect a negative relationship between guilt and 4N endorsement. But 593 
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this may be only true when focusing on omnivores, since the pride vegetarians and 594 
vegans experience with regards to their dietary practices may act as a counterweight 595 
to any guilt they might otherwise experience.   596 
Method 597 
 Participants and diet. A total of 215 participants (119 women, 96 men; 598 
Mage = 31.89, SD = 10.7) participated in a twenty minute survey in exchange for 599 
suitable payment. Participants were recruited online via Mechanical Turk. 600 
Recruitment materials described the study as “a series of questions about your 601 
consumption/use of animal products, particularly concerns you may have about 602 
restricting or not restricting various animal products.” A pre-screening questionnaire 603 
filtered out potential participants who consumed all kinds of meat and other animal 604 
products and who had no concerns about doing so. The aim was to recruit only 605 
individuals who had some misgivings or ambivalence about consuming animal 606 
products. The participant pool included only those who rejected at least one type of 607 
animal-based food product, or omnivores who were considering restricting their 608 
consumption of animal products though currently not refraining from animal-609 
product consumption.  610 
There were two waves of recruitment. Both waves were conducted through 611 
Mechanical Turk. In the initial wave, 182 participants completed the survey. A 612 
second wave was deemed necessary to increase the number of vegetarians and 613 
vegans collected. In the second wave, conducted a week after the first, a pre-614 
screening questionnaire filtered out participants who identified as omnivores or 615 
semi-vegetarians. An additional 33 vegetarian and vegan participants completed the 616 
survey in the second wave. The final sample consisted of 57 participants who self-617 
identified as omnivores, 90 as semi- or partial vegetarians, 44 as vegetarians, 16 as 618 
strict vegetarians/dietary vegans, and 8 as lifestyle vegans.  619 
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 Materials and procedures.  620 
Current diet. For the purpose of the survey, participants were instructed that 621 
“animal products” refers to anything that comes from an animal, including meat, 622 
dairy, eggs, honey, leather, fibers (wool, silk, etc.), and animal-derived ingredients 623 
that are used in a variety of products, such as toiletries. Participants indicated their 624 
current dietary practices with respect to animal products by selecting one diet from 625 
a list of five: “Omnivorous,” “Semi- or Partial Vegetarian,” “Vegetarian,” “Strict 626 
Vegetarian or Dietary Vegan,” or “Lifestyle Vegan” (definitions for each category 627 
were provided, see Appendix A). Participants also indicated which animal products 628 
they currently rejected (i.e., “do not consume or use”) from a list of thirteen.9  629 
 4N scale. The 16-item 4N scale from Study 2 was used to assess 4N 630 
endorsement. Each statement was presented in a randomized order and assessed in 631 
terms of level of agreement on a seven-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = 632 
Strongly agree). Overall, the sixteen items of the 4N scale had a high internal 633 
reliability ( = .94).10 The overall mean for the scale (see Table 6) was lower than 634 
in previous studies, most likely due to the greater sampling of vegetarians and 635 
vegans, and the omission of omnivores who have absolutely no concern about 636 
consuming animal products.  637 
Restriction of animal products. We assessed the degree to which 638 
participants were moving towards increasing or decreasing the level of animal-639 
                                                        
9 Overall, 64% reported currently rejecting red meat (beef, veal, etc.), 61% rejected pork, 
44% rejected seafood, 41% rejected fish, 35% rejected poultry, 20% rejected dairy products, 
18% rejected eggs, 69% rejected the use of fur, 48% rejected non-food products tested on 
animals, 41% rejected leather goods, 31% rejected non-food products containing animal 
ingredients, and 20% rejected other animal-based fibers (wool, silk, etc.); overall, 97% of the 
sample currently rejected at least one animal product. 
10 The internal reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) for each of the 4N subscales ranged from good to 
excellent (Natural  = .80; Nice  = .89; Necessary  = .92), with the exception of Normal, 
which had a below satisfactory internal reliability ( = .63). In the final study, we aimed to 
improve upon several of the Normal subscale items. 
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product restrictions they were engaging in within the past five years, with a single 640 
question: “How would you describe the general direction of your changes with 641 
respect to your consumption/use of animal products over the last 5 years?” Answers 642 
were made along a 1-7 scale (1 = Strongly moving towards less restrictions; 4 = 643 
Fluctuating between restricting and not restricting; 7 = Strongly moving towards 644 
more restrictions), with higher scores representing movement towards greater 645 
restriction. Only participants who indicated that they had changed their diets in the 646 
past five years answered this question. Participants who indicated they had not 647 
changed their diet in the past five years were assigned a score of 4 (thus, a score of 648 
4 represented either no change or fluctuation between restricting and not restricting 649 
animal products). 650 
Pride, guilt, discomfort, and moral self-regard. We included four measures 651 
of people’s emotional and self-appraisal correlates related to their consumption and 652 
use of animal products. These reflected self-conscious moral emotions (guilt, pride) 653 
and moral self-appraisals participants might experience with regards to these dietary 654 
and lifestyle choices. Participants indicated how proud, guilty, and uncomfortable 655 
they felt with regard to their current animal-product decisions, on a 1-7 scale (e.g., 1 656 
= Not at all proud; 7 = Extremely proud). Additionally, they rated on a nine-point 657 
scale how accurately a series of six moral-character traits described them in relation 658 
to their animal-product decisions: inconsistent, principled, reliable, committed, 659 
dedicated, and hypocritical. The overall reliability of the scale was high (α = .90), 660 
thus, the six traits were aggregated to form a moral self-regard index (inconsistent 661 
and hypocritical were reverse scored). See Table 6 for descriptive statistics and 662 
correlations pertaining to these four measures. 663 
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Animal-welfare advocacy. We included three measures of animal-welfare 664 
advocacy, measured on six-point scales. These items encompassed tendencies to 665 
experience negative affect when witnessing animal-welfare violations or attempts to 666 
influence others’ animal-product consumption. Participants were asked how often 667 
they tried to convince others to limit or reject some or all animal products (1 = 668 
Never; 6 = All of the time); how upset they are when eating with others who are 669 
consuming animal products that they reject (1 = Not at all upset; 6 = Extremely 670 
upset); and how angry they are when they see someone wearing a fur coat (1 = Not 671 
at all angry; 6 = Extremely angry). The three items were fairly well inter-correlated 672 
(rs ranged from .39 to .53; α = .62), thus, we aggregated them into a single animal-673 
welfare advocacy index. 674 
Speciesism. Speciesist attitudes (prioritizing human interests over animal 675 
interests) were measured with five items (see Appendix B). Agreement with the 676 
items was measured on a 1-7 scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree), with 677 
higher values representing greater endorsement of Speciesism. The five items were 678 
internally reliable (Cronbach’s  = .84), thus, they were aggregated to form an 679 
index of Speciesism endorsement. Descriptive statistics for the index may be found 680 
in Table 5. 681 
Additional measures. The present study was part of a student’s independent 682 
research project on dietary choices and included some additional measures that were 683 
of less relevance to the present purposes. This included, for instance, a number of 684 
questions about which kinds of animal products participants were planning to 685 
restrict or resume using in the future, their motivations for doing so, measures of 686 
family and social support of their dietary choices, involvement in vegetarian/vegan 687 
or animal welfare groups, their willingness to consume insect-based food as an 688 
THE 4NS  31 
 
 
 
alternative to traditional meat products, qualitative self-evaluations of any 689 
inconsistencies in their dietary behavior, and an assessment of meaning in life (the 690 
4N scale was unrelated to this measure). For brevity’s sake, we do not report on 691 
these measures. Please contact the authors for more information. 692 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 693 
Results 694 
 Diet and 4Ns. Figure 4 depicts the mean 4N scale scores (and standard 695 
errors) by diet. Diet had a large, overall effect on 4N endorsement, F(1,211) = 696 
38.76, p < .001, 2p =.36. As we predicted, omnivores had the highest 4N scores, 697 
followed by semi-vegetarians (see Figure 4). Vegetarians and dietary and lifestyle 698 
vegans had the lowest 4N scores. All post hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD tests) were 699 
significant at p < .001, except the comparison of vegetarians and dietary/lifestyle 700 
vegans, which did not at all differ, p = .906. 701 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 702 
 Correlates of the 4Ns. Table 5 presents correlations between the overall 4N 703 
scale, Speciesism endorsement, the emotion and self-appraisal measures pertaining 704 
to participants’ consumption/use of animal products, animal-welfare advocacy, and 705 
animal product restriction. As expected, the 4N scale was negatively correlated with 706 
animal-welfare advocacy and animal product restriction. In other words, individuals 707 
who endorsed the 4Ns were less involved in animal-welfare advocacy and were less 708 
likely to be moving towards more restrictions with regards to animal product 709 
consumption. Also as predicted, the 4N scale was positively correlated with 710 
Speciesism. That is, individuals who endorsed the 4Ns tended to hold Speciesist 711 
beliefs. Critically, the relationship was moderate in strength, which suggests that 4N 712 
endorsement is a distinct construct from Speciesism. Additionally, the 4N scale was 713 
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negatively correlated with pride in one’s animal-product decisions, and negatively 714 
correlated with moral self-regard derived from such decisions. That is, people who 715 
endorsed the 4Ns experienced less pride and less moral self-regard with respect to 716 
their animal-product decisions. With all dietary groups included in the analysis, 4N 717 
endorsement was uncorrelated with guilt and discomfort over one’s animal-product 718 
decisions. However, when restricting the sample to just omnivores, 4N endorsement 719 
was negatively correlated with guilt experienced in relation to one’s diet, r(55) = -720 
.40, p = .002, though the negative relationship was not significant for discomfort, 721 
r(55) = -.16, p = .246. Thus, omnivores who strongly endorsed the 4Ns experienced 722 
less guilt about their dietary practices than did omnivores who endorsed them to a 723 
lesser degree. 724 
It is worth noting that the 4N scale correlated more strongly than did the 725 
Speciesism scale with all of the outcome measures, with the exception of animal-726 
welfare advocacy. Speciesism had a weak negative correlation with guilt and animal 727 
product restriction, and a moderate negative correlation with animal-welfare 728 
advocacy, suggesting that the more a person endorses Speciesism, the less guilty 729 
they feel about their consumption of animal products, the less inclined they are to 730 
increase their restriction of animal products, and the less likely they are to engage in 731 
animal-welfare advocacy.  732 
In sum, 4N endorsement predicted a number of outcomes related to animal-733 
product consumption, animal-welfare advocacy, Speciesist attitudes, and the self-734 
directed emotional corollaries of engaging in choices pertaining to animal-product 735 
restriction. Critically, there was a negative relationship between 4N endorsement 736 
and guilt over one’s animal-product choices among omnivores, suggesting that 4N 737 
justifications assist with effective guilt regulation.  738 
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Study 5 –Test-Retest Validity of the 4N Scale and Actual Meat Consumption 739 
So far we have shown 4N endorsement to be consistently higher among 740 
individuals who self-identify as omnivores than among individuals who identify as 741 
partial vegetarians, full vegetarians, and vegans. In Study 5, we sought to show that 742 
endorsement of the 4Ns correlates with the frequency with which people consume 743 
meat and other animal products in their diet. Consistent with the idea that 4N 744 
justifications are rationalizations fueled by a desire to continue eating meat, we also 745 
sought to show that 4N endorsement would highly correlate with a person’s explicit 746 
commitment to eating meat. Finally, to polish off the items comprising the 4N scale, 747 
we made minor adjustments to several of the Normal items (in Studies 2-4 the 748 
Normal subscale consistently had the lowest Cronbach’s s), and we administered 749 
the final version of the 4N scale to the same sample at two different time points to 750 
establish the instrument’s test-retest reliability.  751 
Method 752 
 Participants and diet. At Time 1 we recruited a new sample of 236 adults (74 753 
women, 162 men; Mage = 29.67, SD = 8.05) via Mechanical Turk. All participants 754 
were located in the U.S. and paid for participating in a short, two-part study. At Time 755 
1, participants were informed that they would be taking part in a two-part study.  756 
Eleven days later participants were contacted by email and invited to complete Part II. 757 
Participants were given a span of three days to complete Part II. They were given a 758 
security password to enter the survey. In order to anonymously link their responses 759 
from Parts I and II, participants were instructed to generate a unique, memorable code 760 
to enter at Time 1 and Time 2 (emails were also collected at both time points to help 761 
link responses). 762 
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One-hundred and thirty-six participants (47 women, 89 men) completed both 763 
parts of the study (a 58% return rate). The vast majority of participants at Time 1 and 764 
Time 2 classified themselves as omnivores (“I eat meat and other animal products, 765 
like dairy and/or eggs”) (Time 1: 88%; Time 2: 90%). The next largest dietary 766 
category was semi-vegetarian (“I eat meat, but only on rare occasions or only certain 767 
types of meat”) (Time 1: 6%; Time 2: 3%). A few participants were full vegetarians 768 
or vegans (Time 1: 6%; Time 2: 7%). 769 
Materials and procedures.  The surveys comprising Parts I and II were 770 
identical. First, participants answered a slightly revised version of the 16-item 4N 771 
scale. Two of the most problematic Normal items were amended in an attempt to 772 
improve the subscale’s internal reliability. In order to make it more generally 773 
applicable, the item “In my country, not eating meat breaks social norms” was 774 
amended to “Not eating meat is socially unacceptable.” To avoid a double-barreled 775 
phrasing, the item “Most people eat meat, and most people can’t be wrong” was 776 
amended to “Most people I know eat meat” (see Table 8 for a final list of items). 777 
Agreement with the 4Ns was assessed on a 1-7 scale as in Study 4. The 4N scale was 778 
followed by a dietary questionnaire assessing the average number of days per week 779 
(1-7) they ate various animal products (beef, pork, lamb, chicken, fish, seafood, eggs, 780 
dairy) and non-animal products (bread, rice, vegetables, fruit). We included non-781 
animal food products as a test of discriminant validity; the 4N scale should only 782 
correlate with animal-product consumption. Next they responded to a 7-item Meat 783 
Commitment Scale (MCS) developed by the authors (see Appendix C for items). 784 
Lastly, they answered a basic demographics questionnaire. They were debriefed and 785 
paid at both time points.  786 
Results 787 
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 4N intercorrelations and internal reliability. All 4N subscales correlated 788 
strongly with the full scale (rs = .86-.93, ps < .001), and with each other (rs = .69-.81, 789 
ps < .001). The correlations between the 4N subscales ranged from .69 to .81, all 790 
significant at p < .001. The Cronbach’s  of the full scale was .95 at Time 1 and .94 at 791 
Time 2.  792 
Factor Analysis. A principal components factor analysis of the 4N scale 793 
suggested a single-factor solution (eigenvalue = 8.93, explaining 55.8% of the total 794 
variance). All 16 items loaded together above .30 (see Table 6 for factor loadings, 795 
means and standard deviations). The item “Not eating meat is socially unacceptable” 796 
had the lowest loading, probably due to the quite low endorsement of this item.11 The 797 
two lowest loading items, both from the Normal subscale, cross-loaded with a 798 
potential second factor (eigenvalue = 1.65; 10% of the total variance).12 In the 799 
General Discussion, we speculate as to why these two items behaved somewhat 800 
differently from the others. 801 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 802 
Test-retest reliability of 4N scale. The overall test-retest reliability of the full 803 
4N scale was strong, r(134) = .93, p < .001. Table 9 depicts the test-retest correlations 804 
for each of the subscales. The rs ranged from .71 (Normal) to .92 (Nice), with all rs 805 
significant at p < .001. Thus, the 4N scale had strong test-retest reliability over a 806 
period of about two weeks. The Normal subscale had the weakest test-retest 807 
reliability, though it reached adequate levels of reliability. 808 
                                                        
11 One potential suggestion for improving this item in the future would be to phrase it in terms 
of the acceptability of eating meat, rather than the unacceptability of not eating meat.  
12 We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis omitting the two lowest loading Normal 
items, treating the remaining fourteen items as members of a single latent “meat-justification” 
factor. This model provided a less than adequate fit to the data, with χ2(77) = 547.66, p < 
.0001, RMSEA = .161, CFI = .831. However, the fit of the baseline model, compared to the 
saturated model, was much worse, with χ2(91) = 2873.90, p < .0001. An alternative model 
with four distinct latent variables (the 4N categories) with four items each could not be run as 
convergence was not achieved (due most likely to too few items).  
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 809 
4N endorsement. Repeated-measures t-tests were carried out on the 4N 810 
subscale means. Nice (M  = 5.02, SD = 1.54) was endorsed at the highest level, and at 811 
a level significantly higher than the other three Ns, ps < .001. Next, Natural (M = 812 
4.80, SD = 1.41) and Normal (M = 4.72, SD = 0.94) were endorsed at equal levels, p 813 
= .165, and at levels significantly greater than Necessary (M = 4.16, SD = 1.76), ps < 814 
.001, which had the lowest level of endorsement. Overall, men endorsed the 4Ns to a 815 
significantly greater extent than did women (Mmen = 4.79, SD = 1.23 vs. Mwomen = 816 
4.43, SD = 1.33), F(1, 234) = 4.15, p = .043, 2p = .017. Men had higher means for all 817 
4Ns  though only for Natural and Normal were the means significantly higher than for 818 
women.  819 
Commitment to eating meat. The MCS had a strong test-retest reliability of 820 
r(134) = .93, p < .001, and a strong internal reliability, Cronbach’s  = .96 (Time 1), 821 
 = .96 (Time 2). Men were significantly more committed to eating meat (M = 4.87, 822 
SD = 1.70) than were women (M = 4.39, SD = 1.80), F(1, 234) = 4.07, p = .045, 2p = 823 
.017, which is consistent with much past research (e.g., Fagerli & Wandel, 1999; 824 
Rappoport, Peters, Downey, & McCann, 1993; Rothgerber, 2013; Ruby & Heine, 825 
2012). As can be seen in Table 8, the full 4N scale highly correlated with a 826 
commitment to eating meat.13 As an exploratory analysis, we entered each of the 4N 827 
subscales simultaneously into a regression predicting MCS ratings at Time 1.14 Multi-828 
collinearity was a concern, but it was not so problematic to make the test unreliable 829 
(Tolerance range: .22-.38; VIF range: 2.63-4.51). All four subscales were positively 830 
predictive of a commitment to eating meat (s: Natural = .07; Necessary = .10; 831 
                                                        
13 4N endorsement at Time 1 also highly correlated with meat commitment at Time 2, r(134) 
= .83, p < .001. 
14 We did not conduct a comparable analysis with Time 2 scores due to loss of power. 
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Normal = .08; Nice = .14); however, only the Necessary and Nice subscales were 832 
significant, independent predictors, ps < .05 (all other ps > .13).  833 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 834 
Meat consumption. As can be seen in Table 8, the 4N scale selectively 835 
correlated with measures of the frequency with which participants consumed animal 836 
products, but it did not correlate with consumption frequencies for non-animal food 837 
products.  The correlations were strongest for meat products (e.g., beef, chicken, 838 
pork), but were significant for eggs and dairy products as well. Of the 4Ns, 839 
endorsement of Necessary was the most reliable correlate of animal-product 840 
consumption. It significantly correlated with the consumption of all eight categories 841 
of animal products. 842 
General Discussion  843 
Morally motivated vegetarians, although a minority, may serve as a source 844 
of implicit moral reproach for many omnivores, eliciting behaviors designed to 845 
defend against moral condemnation (Minson & Monin, 2012). One method for 846 
rendering moral vegetarians nonthreatening, examined here, is to rationalize or 847 
provide reasonable justification for one’s consumption of animal products. The 848 
present research built upon the theorizing of Joy (2010) pertaining to the 3Ns of 849 
Justification—that eating meat is natural, normal, and necessary. To this list, we 850 
added a fourth N—that eating meat is nice (i.e., enjoyable, satisfying, etc.).  851 
Consistent with this theorizing, Studies 1a-1b identified the 4Ns (Natural, Normal, 852 
Necessary and Nice) as the principal justifications used to argue for the 853 
acceptability of eating meat. Furthermore, Studies 2-5 documented the relationship 854 
between 4N endorsement and a number of important variables related to meat 855 
consumption and animal-welfare concerns.  856 
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Overall, omnivores tended to endorse the 4Ns more so than partial 857 
vegetarians, full vegetarians, and vegans (Studies 2 and 4). Moreover, individuals 858 
who tended to endorse the 4Ns included fewer animals in their circle of moral 859 
concern (Study 2), attributed fewer mental capacities to cows (Study 2), were more 860 
tolerant and supportive of social inequality (Study 2), were less motivated by ethical 861 
concerns when making food choices (Study 3), were less active in advocating on 862 
behalf of animals (Study 4), held Speciesist attitudes more strongly (Study 4), were 863 
less proud of their consumer choices pertaining to animals (Study 4), were less 864 
likely to be moving towards greater restriction of animal products in their diet 865 
(Study 4), tended to consume meat and other animal products more frequently in 866 
their weekly diet (Study 5), and tended to be highly committed to eating meat in the 867 
future (Study 5). Furthermore, omnivores who strongly endorsed the 4Ns tended to 868 
experience less guilt with regards to their animal-product choices than did 869 
omnivores who endorsed the 4Ns to a lesser extent (Study 4), suggesting that the 870 
4Ns are effective for reducing guilt. Consistent with theorizing by Joy (2010), it 871 
would seem that the 4Ns are a powerful, pervasive tool employed by individuals to 872 
diffuse the guilt one might otherwise experience when consuming animal products.  873 
Implications for omnivore-vegetarian discourse 874 
 In Study 2, we observed that omnivores tended to endorse all four of the Ns, 875 
while vegetarians and partial-vegetarians tended not to endorse them, or to endorse 876 
them to a much lesser degree. In other words, rather than participants independently 877 
agreeing with one another about the validity of a few of the Ns, participants tended 878 
to endorse or reject every available justification that was consistent with their 879 
position, reflecting a myside bias or belief-overkill effect (see also Baron, 1995; 880 
Stanovich et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the Ns that produced the greatest levels of 881 
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disagreement across dietary groups were Necessary and Nice. This suggests that 882 
beliefs about the necessity of eating meat, and the pleasure derived from eating 883 
meat, may be the least persuasive of the 4Ns in convincing a vegetarian audience. It 884 
also suggests, as we observed in Study 5, that Necessary and Nice may be the most 885 
useful N for predicting divergent dietary attitudes. By contrast, endorsement of the 886 
naturalness of eating meat (e.g., that human beings have evolved body structures 887 
adapted to eating meat) was the most uniform across dietary groups, in that it 888 
produced the highest ratings of endorsement among vegetarians (though still below 889 
the mid-point). In other words, the belief that it is natural to eat meat may be most 890 
widely accepted of the 4Ns as having a factual basis. We might speculate that 891 
beliefs about the naturalness of eating meat may be the most persistent and difficult 892 
to overturn. Looking to the future, independent manipulations of the 4Ns would 893 
help clarify these issues.  894 
Future research might also test which of the 4N justifications present the 895 
greatest challenge to meat-reduction campaigns aimed at promoting healthy and 896 
environmentally sustainable eating habits. Based on our observations, we would 897 
speculate that the perceived necessity of meat consumption may be the most 898 
formidable of the 4Ns given that it is frequently offered in defense of eating meat 899 
(Studies 1a-1b) and strongly endorsed by omnivores as a justification (Studies 2-5), 900 
though we acknowledge as others have (e.g., Lea & Worsely, 2001) that the 901 
niceness, or hedonic pleasure, derived from meat is another formidable obstacle.  902 
The 4N scale and the MEJ scale 903 
The scale we developed for assessing endorsement of the 4Ns on a 904 
continuum consistently showed strong internal reliability and, in Study 5, strong 905 
test-retest reliability. The four subscales, for the most part, loaded onto a single 906 
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factor, with the possible exception of the Normal subscale, which had two items that 907 
loaded to the overall scale at lower levels. These two items (“Most people I know 908 
eat meat”, “Not eating meat is socially unacceptable”) are distinct from the other 909 
scale items in that they may be understood simply as statements of fact or 910 
observations rather than opinions or attitudes. As a consequence, individuals with 911 
different dietary orientations living within the same societal context could 912 
potentially share high-levels of overlap in their endorsement (or non-endorsement) 913 
of these items, and this may explain their distinct factor loadings. Indeed, the 914 
relatively extreme means for these two items (see Table 6) is consistent with this 915 
supposition. Given the recurrently lower loadings of these two Normal items, we 916 
recommend continued efforts to improve their loadings, for example, by rephrasing 917 
the items (e.g., “Eating meat is an acceptable practice in my society”).  918 
Importantly, the overall 4N scale correlated strongly with motivations to 919 
continue eating meat and with actual meat consumption, confirming its predictive 920 
validity. In Study 3, we observed moderate to strong positive correlations between 921 
the 4N scale and the Direct-strategies subscale of Rothgerber’s (2013) MEJ scale. 922 
Furthermore, both the 4N scale and the MEJ-Direct scale correlated negatively with 923 
ethically motivated food choices (i.e., people who endorsed the 4Ns or who engaged 924 
in direct meat-eating justification strategies made food choices that were less 925 
motivated by ethical concerns for animals or the environment).  926 
Although there is some redundancy between the two scales, we submit that 927 
there are several favorable strengths to the 4N scale in relation to the MEJ. First, as 928 
we have shown in Studies 1a-1b, the 4Ns comprise the bulk of real-world 929 
justifications omnivores volunteer in defense of eating meat. As such, the 4N 930 
scheme represents a parsimonious way of classifying the principal justifications 931 
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supporting meat consumption. For example, Natural in the 4N classification 932 
encompasses several of the MEJ subscales, including hierarchy, fate, and religion. 933 
Second, the 4N scheme includes one major justification category largely missing 934 
from the MEJ—that eating meat is normal. Finally, the factor structure of the 4N 935 
scale is more internally coherent than the factor structure of the MEJ. Conceptually, 936 
the MEJ scale is purportedly measuring nine lower-order, or two higher-order, 937 
constructs (see Rothgerber, 2013), while the 4N scale is arguably measuring one 938 
construct (meat-eating rationalizations) with four subcomponents. Consistent with 939 
this conceptualized structure, we consistently obtained single-factor structures for 940 
the 4N scale. By contrast, the MEJ produced two, possibly three, independent 941 
factors (see Study 3).   942 
In short, the 4N scheme is conceptually and empirically parsimonious as a 943 
measure of meat-eating justifications. By contrast, the MEJ is conceptually and 944 
empirically complex, as it is intended to capture other, indirect strategies for 945 
continuing in the practice of eating meat beyond rationalization, including 946 
avoidance, dissociation, and dichotomizing. Thus, we recommend using the 4N 947 
scale when the focus of a research team is on rationalizing meat-eating in particular, 948 
while the MEJ may be more suitable for researchers whose aims are broader. 949 
Limitations and future directions 950 
The present research has a number of limitations. In particular, the studies 951 
recruited participants either from the US or Australia where omnivores are the 952 
dominant dietary group. Although we sampled individuals reporting a diverse 953 
variety of dietary practices, from no meat restriction to complete restriction of all 954 
meat and other animal products, it would be interesting to compare endorsement of 955 
the 4Ns at the level of nations rather than simply at the level of individuals. Given 956 
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the high rates of vegetarianism in India (European Vegetarian Union, 2008), a 957 
country-level comparison between Indian and Western samples would be helpful in 958 
illuminating the structural role of 4N rationalization in maintaining omnivorous 959 
diets at the societal level. For instance, there are likely to be society-level 960 
differences regarding the perceived necessity and normalness of eating meat, which 961 
may predict variability in meat consumption across societies. Additionally, the 4N 962 
scale may be limited by its treatment of “meat” in a general manner, as opposed to 963 
assessing beliefs about specific meat products. This might be a limitation when 964 
comparing results from the 4N scale across cultures, as people from different 965 
cultures may use different prototypes or exemplars of “meat” when answering the 966 
scale. For example, some cultures may have fish and seafood more centrally located 967 
in their concept of meat than other cultures. Preliminary research conducted by our 968 
team suggests that at least some Americans (32%) spontaneously think of seafood 969 
products when asked to list different types of meat. Given the heterogeneity in 970 
thinking about meat, future research using the 4N scale would benefit from 971 
comparing 4N endorsement across different meat categories. 972 
The present studies are also limited by their predominantly correlational 973 
methodologies. In the future it would be useful to examine meat-eating 974 
rationalization processes in situ, that is, in relation to behavioral manipulations of 975 
meat consumption or consumer motivation, as has been done within some animal 976 
objectification studies (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012; Loughnan et al., 2010).  Based on 977 
evidence gathered here, we would expect behavioral manipulations of meat 978 
consumption or consumer motivations to increase levels of 4N endorsement relative 979 
to the consumption of non-animal products, and, conversely, manipulations of the 980 
4Ns to decrease the discomfort an omnivore may experience with regards to their 981 
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meat consumption. We might also predict that manipulating perceptions of the 982 
validity of various Ns (e.g., the necessity of eating meat) would impact willingness 983 
to consume meat. Such findings would demonstrate that the 4N rationalizations are 984 
not simply post hoc arguments (see Haidt, 2001) but can play a causal role in 985 
people’s decision-making. Finally, further research is also needed to explore the 986 
role of 4N rationalizations in other contemporary controversies beyond diet and 987 
animal-welfare concerns.     988 
Conclusion 989 
 The relationships people have with animals are complicated. While most 990 
people enjoy the company of animals and billions of dollars are spent each year on 991 
pet care and maintenance, most people continue to eat animals as food (Herzog, 992 
2010; Joy, 2010). People employ a number of strategies to overcome this apparent 993 
contradiction in attitude and behavior (Loughnan et al., 2014). As we have seen 994 
here, one important and prevalent strategy is to rationalize that meat consumption is 995 
natural, normal, necessary, and nice. Rationalizing enables omnivores to continue in 996 
a dietary practice that has increasingly come under public scrutiny. It is difficult to 997 
predict whether endorsement of the 4Ns will decrease over time. However, like 998 
many controversial issues (see Liu & Ditto, 2013), as attitudes towards meat 999 
consumption shift, so too may the beliefs that support them.  1000 
  1001 
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Appendix A 1007 
Descriptions of Diet Categories Used in Study 4 1008 
Diet Description 
Omnivorous  Consume animal products, except those excluded for taste 
preference, medical (e.g., allergy, intolerance), and/or religious 
reasons.  
 
Semi- or Partial 
Vegetarian 
Consume some, but not all, of the following: red meat (beef, 
veal, etc.), pork, poultry, fish, and/or seafood. Consume eggs 
and dairy products. 
 
Vegetarian Never consume red meat (beef, veal, etc.), pork, poultry, fish, 
or seafood, but may consume eggs and/or dairy products.  
 
Strict 
Vegetarian or 
Dietary Vegan 
Never consume any animal products, including red meat (beef, 
veal, etc.), pork, poultry, fish, seafood, eggs, dairy products, or 
other animal products (e.g., gelatin, casein, etc.). 
 
Lifestyle Vegan Never consume any animal products, and avoid some or all 
non-food animal products (e.g., leather, silk, cosmetics 
containing animal ingredients, etc.) and/or products tested on 
animals. 
 1009 
Appendix B 1010 
Speciesism Scale Used in Study 4 1011 
1. We should always elevate human interests over the interests of animals. 1012 
2. When human interests conflict with animal interests, human interests should 1013 
always be given priority. 1014 
3. We should strive to alleviate human suffering before alleviating the suffering 1015 
of animals. 1016 
4. The suffering of animals is just as important as the suffering of humans. 1017 
(reverse scored)  1018 
5. Having extended basic rights to minorities and women, it is now time to 1019 
extend them also to animals. (reverse scored) 1020 
 1021 
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Appendix C 1022 
Meat Commitment Scale Used in Study 5 1023 
1. I don’t want to eat meals without meat. 1024 
2. When choosing food, I virtually always select the meat option. 1025 
3. I can’t imagine giving up meat. 1026 
4. I am committed to eating meat. 1027 
5. The best part of most meals is the meat portion. 1028 
6. I would never give up eating meat. 1029 
7. I cannot imagine substituting meat from a meal. 1030 
 1031 
 1032 
  1033 
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Tables 1205 
Table 1  1206 
Coding scheme used to score participants spontaneous meat-eating justifications in 1207 
Studies 1a-1b. 1208 
Category Definition Examples 
Natural Appeals to biology, biological 
hierarchy, natural selection, human 
evolution, or the naturalness of eating 
meat. 
“It is natural for humans to eat meat”; 
“Humans are carnivores”; 
“Evolutionarily hominids have always 
eaten meat”; “Organisms consuming 
each other is something that is prevalent 
in nature”; “Humans were meant to have 
dominion over animals”  
Necessary Appeals to the necessity of meat for 
survival, strength, development, 
health, animal population control, or 
economic stability. 
“Humans need meat to survive”; “Our 
bodies need the protein”; “Meat provides 
good nutrients”; “Protein is a necessary 
part of our diet”; “Because if we didn't, 
there would be an overabundance of 
certain animals” 
Normal Appeals to dominant societal norms, 
normative behavior, historical human 
behavior, or socially constructed food 
pyramids. 
“Society says it’s okay”; “I was raised 
eating meat”; “Meat is culturally 
accepted”; “A lot of other people eat 
meat” 
Nice Appeals to the tastiness of meat, or 
that it is fulfilling or satisfying. 
“It tastes good”; “It’s delicious”; “Tastes 
great (I mean bacon…come on)” 
Humane Appeals to the “humane” nature of “As long as you know it comes from a 
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Slaughter slaughtering practices. company that does not mistreat animals”; 
“Humane options exist for meat 
products” 
Religion Appeals to religion, scripture, God, or 
divine sovereignty, without also 
appealing to human nature, biology, or 
social norms. 
“It’s allowed by my religious creed”; 
“According to God there is no unclean 
animals to eat”; “God provided them for 
us to eat” 
Sustainable Appeals to the sustainable nature of 
meat as a renewable resource. 
“Fish create less waste than other 
animals” 
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous arguments (e.g., 
appeals to dietary freedom, availability 
of meat, inferiority of animals, etc.). 
“It’s readily available”; “The animals are 
already killed”; “Animals are not nearly 
as intelligent as humans”; “This is 
America and I am free to do what I want” 
Unscorable Does not answer the question or 
rejects the premise that eating meat is 
not OK. 
“I am not a vegetarian”; “It’s not morally 
wrong” 
 1209 
 1210 
  1211 
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Table 2  1212 
Correlations between the 4N scale and other measures in Study 2 1213 
 2 3 4 
1. 4N scale -.47*** -.37*** .52*** 
2. Moral concern - .44*** -.45*** 
3. Mind attribution - - -.44*** 
4. SDO - - - 
Note. *** p < .001. SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. Ns = 159-171. 1214 
 1215 
 1216 
 1217 
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations between 4N scale and MEJ subscales (Study 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. *** p < .001. Ns = 192 non-vegetarians/vegans. MEJ = Meat-Eating Justification (Rothgerber, 2013). 
 
  
 MEJ Direct  MEJ Indirect 
Pro-
meat 
Deny Dichot. Fate Religion Health Hierarchy Dissoc. Avoid 
4N Scale  .71*** .58*** .34*** .78*** .49*** .84*** .70*** .06 -.14 
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Table 4 
Pearson correlations between 4N scale and food choice motivations (Study 3). 
 Non-ethical Motivations Ethical Motivations 
Health Familiarity Sensory 
appeal 
Natural 
content 
Weight 
control 
Animal 
Welfare 
Environmental 
Protection 
4N scale  -.10 .24*** .11 -.09 .09 -.10 -.16* 
MEJ scale -.13 .24*** .14 -.19** .06 -.12 -.23** 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Non-ethical motivations from FQC (Steptoe et al., 1995); ethical motivations from Lindeman and 
Väänänen (2000). Ns = 192 non-vegetarians/vegans. 
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Table 5 
Correlations between 4N scale and measures from Study 4.  
 Mean 
(SD) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. 4N scale 3.30 
(1.28) 
.42*** -.22** .08 .03 -.24** -.25*** -.41*** 
2. Speciesism 3.55 
(1.31) 
- -.10 -.17* -.10 -.09 -.36*** -.19** 
3. Pride in animal-product 
decisions 
4.69 
(1.68) 
- - -.45*** -.15* .63*** .23** .28*** 
4. Guilt about animal-product 
decisions 
2.75 
(1.58) 
- - - .31*** -.61*** .09 -.22** 
5. Discomfort over animal-
product decisions 
2.70 
(1.64) 
- - - - -.28*** .10 -.05 
6. Moral self-regard derived 
from animal-product decisions 
6.31 
(1.77) 
- - - - - .19** .28*** 
7. Animal-welfare advocacy 2.09 
(0.80) 
- - - - - - .21** 
8. Restriction of animal products 5.09 
(1.41) 
- - - - - - - 
Note. All measurements assessed on 1-7 scales, with the exception of animal-welfare advocacy (1-6) and moral self-regard (1-9). 
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Table 6 
Final Version of the 4N Scale: Unrotated factor loadings, means, and standard deviations from Study 5. 
Scale Items Loadings M (SD) 
Natural   
It is only natural to eat meat. .858 5.04 (1.67) 
It is unnatural to eat an all plant-based diet. .787 3.86 (1.82) 
Our human ancestors ate meat all the time. .677 5.29 (1.64) 
Human beings naturally crave meat. .788 5.00 (1.91) 
Necessary   
It is necessary to eat meat in order to be healthy. .815 4.00 (1.91) 
You cannot get all the protein, vitamins, and mineral you 
need on an all plant-based diet. 
.716 4.05 (2.02) 
Human beings need to eat meat. .834 4.15 (1.91) 
A healthy diet requires at least some meat. .847 4.47 (1.93) 
Normal   
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Not eating meat is socially unacceptable. .334 2.69 (1.62) 
It is abnormal for humans not to eat meat. .773 3.92 (1.73) 
Most people I know eat meat. .400 6.34 (0.88) 
It is normal to eat meat. .709 5.93 (1.33) 
Nice   
Meat is delicious. .670 6.04 (1.38) 
Meat adds so much flavor to a meal it does not make 
sense to leave it out. 
.847 4.74 (1.83) 
The best tasting food is normally a meat based dish (e.g., 
steak, chicken breast, grilled fish). 
.821 5.08 (1.80) 
Meals without meat would just be bland and boring. .832 4.24 (1.98) 
Note. Level of agreement or disagreement rated on a 1-7 scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree). 
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Table 7 
Test-retest reliabilities (correlations) for each of the 4N subscales and the full scale. 
 
 
Time 1 
Natural  Necessary  Normal Nice Full 4N 
Scale  
Time 2  .86*** .89*** .71*** .92*** .93*** 
Note. *** p  < .001. N = 136. 
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Table 8 
Correlations between 4Ns and dietary measures from Study 5. 
  Animal Products Non-Animal Products 
4Ns MCS Beef Pork Lamb Chicken Fish  Seafood Eggs Dairy Bread Rice Veg Fruit 
Natural .77*** .37*** .14* .06 .36*** .12 .08 .12 .14* .05 -.01 -.07 .01 
Necessary .69*** .38*** .18** .16* .38*** .25*** .15* .14* .16* .03 .10 -.09 .05 
Normal .69*** .41*** .21** .12 .31*** .15* .08 .12 .11 -.02 .00 -.04 .03 
Nice .88*** .41*** .23*** .04 .38*** .12 .07 .17** .23*** .05 .01 -.03 .00 
Full Scale .85*** .44*** .21** .10 .41*** .18** .11 .16* .18** .04 .04 -.07 .03 
Note. MCS = Meat Commitment Scale. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
N = 236. 
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Figures and Captions 
 
Figure 1. Frequency of various meat-eating justifications from Study 1a. N = 176 
Penn undergraduate students. 
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Figure 2. Frequency of various meat-eating justifications from Study 1b. N = 107 
MTurk workers. 
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Figure 3. 4N endorsement means and standard errors by diet (Study 2). Bars  1 SE.  
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Figure 4. Mean 4N scores by diet (Study 3). Error bars  1 S.E. 
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